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Ellen	Fridland	King’s	College	London	
Draft	version:	please	do	not	cite	without	author’s	consent			 Longer,	Smaller,	Faster	Stronger:	on	skills	and	intelligence		One	prominent	feature	of	skill	is	the	way	in	which	it	is	acquired.	That	is,	skills	such	as	riding	a	bike,	typing,	or	playing	the	piano	are	learned	through	practice	and	not	through	deliberation,	reflection,	or	memorization	alone.	Philosophers	have	appreciated	this	fact	about	skill	for	ages1	but	despite	a	general	recognition,	no	philosophical	account	of	the	exact	connection	between	skill	and	practice	has	ever	been	forwarded.	To	make	clear	what	I	mean,	compare	the	following	questions:	one	might	think	that	when	we	ask	about	the	connection	between	practice	and	skill,	we	are	asking	a	question	about	final	causes.	As	such,	when	we	ask,	“what	is	learned	through	practice?”	the	obvious	answer	would	be:	“skill”!		However,	we	might	take	the	question	to	be	of	a	different	sort,	to	be	a	question	about	formal	causes	and,	thus,	to	be	something	like	the	following:	“how	does	practice	change	our	behaviors	such	that	they	go	from	being	awkward,	unskilled	actions	to	elegant,	skilled	performances?”	If	that’s	the	question	we	are	asking	then	what	we	want	to	know	is	
how	practice	changes	or	impacts	our	behaviors.	That	is,	we	don’t	want	to	know	what	practice	is	for	but	we	want	to	know	what	practice	does.2	It	is	this	latter	question	that	I	will	explore	in	this	paper.	Importantly,	once	the	answer	to	that	question	becomes	clear,	we	will	be	in	a	position	to	see	why	skilled	performances,	though	automatic	in	many	ways,	cannot	be	thought	of	as	mindless,	brute	or	unintelligent.	Rather,	skilled	actions	are	cognitive	and	minded	almost	all	the	way	down.			 This	paper	will	proceed	in	four	sections:	in	the	first	section	I	will	defend	the	tight	connection	between	practice	and	skill	and	then	go	on	to	make	precise	how	we	ought	to	construe	the	concept	of	practice.	In	the	second	section,	I	will	suggest	that	practice	contributes	to	skill	by	structuring	and	automatizing	the	motor	routines	constitutive	of	skilled	actions.	I	will	cite	how	this	fact	about	skilled	action	has	misled	many	philosophers	to	conclude	that	skills	are	mindless	or	bodily.	In	the	third	section	of	the	paper,	I	will	challenge	this	common	misconception	about	automaticity	by	appealing	to	empirical	evidence	of	motor	chunking.	This	evidence	reveals	that	there	are	two	opposing	processes	involved	in	the	automaticity	of	skilled	action:	one	process	that	is	largely	associative,	which	I	will	call	“concatenation”	and	the	second,	a	controlled	cognitive	process,	that	I	will	call	“segmentation”.	As	a	result	of	this	evidence,	we	will	be	in	a	position	to	see	clearly	why	skills	are	minded	and	intelligent	not	merely	during	their	acquisition	and	not	simply	in	virtue	of	their	connection	to	intentional	states,	but,	rather,	in	their	very	nature.	I	will	end	by	reflecting	on	some	
																																																								1	For	instance,	see	Matt	Stichter’s	(2007)	defense	of	Aristotle’s	view	of	skill	as	“empiricist”,	i.e.,	holding	that	skills	are	learned	through	practice	puts	Aristotle’s	view	in	line	with	the	accounts	of	Isocrates	and	the	rhetoricians.		2	See	Aristotle	Physics II 3 and Metaphysics V 2 for	a	discussion	of	the	four	causes. 
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theoretical	reasons	for	why	this	is	exactly	what	we	should	expect	to	be	the	case	when	it	comes	to	skilled	action.			I.	Practice	and	Skill	 	It’s	no	secret	that	when	we	set	out	to	learn	a	new	skill,	the	way	in	which	we	learn	that	skill	is	through	practice.	After	all,	we	learn	to	dance	the	ballet	by	dancing	ballet	and	we	learn	to	play	the	piano	by	playing	the	piano.	Of	course,	Aristotle	made	this	point	in	the	Nichomachean	Ethics	ages	ago.	Aristotle	writes:		What	we	need	to	learn	to	do,	we	learn	by	doing;	for	example,	we	become	builders	by	building,	and	lyre	players	by	playing	the	lyre.	So	too	we	become	just	by	doing	just	actions,	temperate	by	doing	temperate	actions	and	courageous	by	courageous	actions	(NE	1033	a	32-b2).				This	way	of	acquiring	skills	is	to	be	contrasted	with	other	methods	of	acquiring	knowledge	or	expertise,	such	as	through	deliberation,	memorization,	or	reflection.		Notably,	skills	are	special	in	that	we	learn	them	by	performing	them	and	not	just	by	thinking	about	them.	This	is	not	to	say	that	we	don’t	also	think	a	lot	about	the	skills	that	we	are	learning	to	perform.	It	is	only	to	say	that,	in	addition	to	thinking,	actual	doing	is	required	for	skill	acquisition.		 It	is,	of	course,	also	a	familiar	fact	about	skills	that	people	often	continue	to	practice	their	skills	long	after	they	have	been	acquired.	That	is,	we	humans	have	the	strange	habit	of	practicing	a	skill	long	after	it	is	probable	that	we	will	be	able	to	perform	it	to	a	reasonable	degree	of	success	in	a	reasonably	large	number	of	circumstances.3		Just	think,	professional	tennis	players	like	Serena	Williams	and	Roger	Federer	still	practice	on	court	for	hours	a	day	almost	every	day.	And	tennis	is	not	an	exceptional	sport	in	this	regard.	When	it	comes	to	skill,	practice	is	involved	not	only	in	skill	acquisition	but	in	the	ongoing	refinement	of	skill	as	well.			 The	connection	between	practice	and	skill	has	been	widely	appreciated	by	both	philosophers	and	psychologists.	So,	for	instance,	when	distinguishing	habit	from	skill,	that	is,	when	distinguishing	unintelligent,	automatic	behaviors	from	intelligent,	fluid	actions,	Gilbert	Ryle	(1949)	focuses	on	learning.	He	writes:		[A]	mountaineer	walking	over	ice-covered	rocks	in	a	high	wind	in	the	dark	does	not	move	his	limbs	by	blind	habit;	he	thinks	what	he	is	doing,	he	is	ready	for	emergencies,	he	economises	in	effort,	he	makes	tests	and	experiments;	in	short	he	walks	with	some	degree	of	skill	and	judgment.		If	he	makes	a	mistake,	he	is	inclined	not	to	repeat	it,	and	if	he	finds	a	new	trick	effective	he	is	inclined	to	continue	to	use	it	and	to	improve	on	it.	He	is	concomitantly	walking	and	teaching	himself	how	to	walk	in	conditions	of	this	sort.	It	is	of	the	essence	of	merely	habitual	practices	that	one	performance	is	a	replica	of	its	predecessors.		It	is	of	the	essence	of	intelligent	practices	that	one	performance	is	modified	by	its	predecessors.	The	agent	is	still	learning.		(p.42)																																																										3	See	Millikan	(2000),	section	4.3,	for	a	discussion	of	the	ways	in	which	abilities	can	succeed	and	be	improved.	
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This	passage	highlights	the	requirement	for	attentive,	intelligent,	deliberate	instantiations	of	behavior	in	the	development	of	skilled	action.	What	we	should	notice	is	that	there	are	different	ways	of	performing	actions.		And,	importantly,	simply	executing	or	even	repeatedly	executing	an	action	is	not	sufficient	for	performing	it	intelligently	or	for	developing	from	it	an	intelligent	capacity.	Rather,	an	action	has	to	be	performed	in	a	particular	way	in	order	for	it	to	contribute	to	that	action	becoming	or	continuing	to	develop	as	a	skill.	Specifically,	the	action	must	be	performed	in	such	a	way	that	the	agent	intentionally	continues	to	learn	while	she	is	performing	the	action.		This	kind	of	engagement,	I’ll	claim,	is	central	to	the	characterization	of	practice.	Barbara	Montero	(forthcoming)	has	made	a	similar	point.	She	writes,		As	the	psychologist	K.	Anders	Ericsson	(1993)	has	documented,	those	who	excel	in	a	wide	variety	of	fields	have	not	only	engaged	in	ten	years	of	practice	(this	is	a	reference	to	the	ten	
year	rule	that	was	first	forwarded	as	definitive	of	expertise	in	1899	by	Bryan	and	Hartner),	but	have	engaged	in	ten	years	of	deliberate	practice—that	is,	practice	that	involves	not	only	doing	the	actions	over	and	over	again,	as	might	be	true	of	our	daily	activities	like	buttoning	a	shirt	or	driving	to	the	office,	but	also	involves	working	on	aspects	that	are	difficult	and,	after	practice,	analyzing	one’s	own	successes	and	failures.	Beyond	this,	I	would	add	that	in	order	for	someone	to	count	as	an	expert	under	my	stipulative	definition,	such	individuals	engage	in	ongoing	practice	(Montero,	forthcoming).		As	we	can	see,	it	is	a	fairly	mainstream	in	sports	psychology	to	hold	that	a	very	particular	kind	of	intellectual	engagement	is	involved	in	the	acquisition	and	refinement	of	skilled	actions.	In	fact,	it	seems	that	the	intention	to	improve	or	at	least	to	stabilize	or	maintain	one’s	skills	is	essential	to	practice.	After	all,	even	those	philosophers	who	characterize	the	pinnacle	of	expertise	as	ultimately	mindless	or	bodily	still	acknowledge	that	deliberate,	intentional,	intelligent,	minded	activity	is	involved	in	practicing	and	developing	skills	in	the	first	place.	4	That	is,	even	philosophers	who	hold	that	skill,	once	acquired,	is	no	longer	best	described	as	cognitive	or	intelligent,	still	accept	that	conscious,	deliberate	thought	and	effort	are	centrally	implicated	in	practice.		To	further	precesify	the	notion	of	practice,	I’d	like	to	add	that	practice	often	involves	not	only	the	deliberate	attempt	to	improve	one’s	performance	in	general	(for	example,	making	a	basket	or	landing	a	cartwheel	or	swimming	faster),	but	also	involves	aiming	to	improve	the	technique	by	which	one	is	able	to	perform	the	skilled	action	successfully.		That	is,	during	practice,	skilled	agents	often	attempt	to	improve	not	only	their	ends	but	also	the	means	by	which	those	ends	are	achieved.	The	point,	then,	is	that	practice	often	involves	the	means	of	a	task	becoming	ends	in	themselves,	at	least	temporarily.	5		So,	for	example,	a	gymnast	may	practice	her	hand	placement	on	the	beam	independently	of	the	way	in	which	that	hand	placement	is	related	to	successfully	performing	a	back-handspring.	That	is,	even	though	proper	hand	placement	is																																																									4	See,	for	instance,	Anderson	(1982)	and Dreyfus & Dreyfus (1986). 	5	For	a	defense	of	this	notion	of	practice	and	consideration	of	the	significance	for	understanding	human	cognition	see:	Fridland	(2013,	2014)	and	Fridland	&	Moore	(2014).	
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essential	for	successfully	performing	a	back-handspring	on	beam,	during	practice,	the	gymnast	will	practice	proper	hand	placement	as	an	independent	task.	I	maintain	that	skills,	very	generally,	have	this	kind	of	structure	and	that	practicing	a	skill	often	involves	the	means,	at	least	temporarily,	becoming	ends	in	themselves.6	We	should	notice	that	performing	an	action	attentively	and	deliberately	should	result	in	improvements.	However,	performing	an	action	in	the	way	specified	here,	such	that	the	technique	itself	becomes	the	object	of	attention	and	deliberate	effort	narrows	the	scope	of	proper	practice	even	further.	Moreover,	it	does	so	in	such	a	way	that	it	is	at	the	very	least	possible	that	only	humans	practice	in	the	latter,	more	demanding	manner.7		In	this	section,	I’ve	claimed	that	the	intimate	connection	between	skill	and	practice	has	been	widely	appreciated	by	both	philosophers	and	psychologists.	And,	further,	I’ve	claimed	that	practice	is	commonly	understood	to	be	an	explicitly	intellectual	or	intelligent	phenomenon.		I’ve	also	maintained	that	in	skill	learning	the	goal	of	practice	is	often	not	only	to	successfully	perform	a	task,	but	also	to	improve	or	refine	the	way	or	means	by	which	the	task	is	performed.	I	take	it	that,	until	now,	I	have	not	said	anything	particularly	controversial.		II.	Practice	and	Automaticity	Another	claim	that	I	take	to	be	relatively	uncontroversial	is	that	actions	become	automatic	as	a	result	of	practice.		That	is,	as	a	result	of	practice,	motor	routines—the	learned	motor	representations	that	ground	the	instantiation	of	complex	action	sequences—go	from	being	slow,	error-prone,	and	difficult	to	control	to	becoming	fast,	accurate,	and	transparent—i.e.,	not	requiring	deliberate,	conscious	attention	or	effort.8	This	fact	about	skilled	actions	is	sometimes	taken	to	entail	that	skills	are	bodily	phenomena	and	not	properly	minded	or	cognitive	ones.	I	take	the	conceptual	move	from	automatic	to	mindless	to	be	fundamentally	flawed.	I	will	present	examples	of	a	number	of	philosophers	making	this	move	below	and	present	empirical	evidence	of	why	it	is	mistaken	in	section	3.		 	First,	it	is	worth	noting	that	the	idea	that	skills	become	automatic	as	a	result	of	practice	is	widely	accepted	by	both	philosophers	and	psychologists.	Further,	it	is	widely	acknowledged	that	one	of	the	main	benefits	of	automaticity	is	that	it	alleviates	an	agent’s	cognitive	burden.	That	is,	it	is	commonly	accepted	that																																																									6	This	is	an	important	point	to	recognize	if	we	want	to	tie	skill	learning	to	human	cognition,	generally,	and	to	imitation,	in	particular.	This	is	because	imitation	is	often	thought	to	have	the	functional,	evolutionary	role	of	allowing	humans	to	learn	skills.	And	what	the	studies	on	imitation	and	especially	on	overimitation	show	clearly	is	that	the	humans	have	a	particular	obsession	not	only	with	the	goals	of	a	task	(that	is,	humans	not	only	emulate)	but	with	the	fine-grained	detailed	strategy	with	which	a	task	if	performed	(i.e.,	they	imitate).	For	more	on	this,	see,	for	instance:	Call, Carpenter & Tomasello; 
(2005); Fridland	and	Moore	(2014); Horner	&	Whiten	(2005);	Over	and	Carpenter	(2012);	Tomasello	1996,	1999.	7	See	Fridland	and	Moore	(2014)	and	Fridland	(forthcoming	b.)	for	a	defense	of	the	uniqueness	of	the	technique-centered	orientation	to	humans.	See	also	Sterelny	(2012)	for	more	on	the	distinction	between	human	and	non-human	primate	skill	learning.			8	I	don’t	take	this	to	be	a	comprehensive	list	of	features	of	automaticity.	And,	in	fact,	I	don’t	think	such	a	feature	list	is	possible.	I’ve	argued	so	much	in	Fridland	(forthcoming).	Rather,	I	take	it	that	I	am	pointing	to	several	features	of	automaticity	that	are	relevant	to	this	discussion.	
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automatic	behaviors	do	not	require	(or	require	much	less	of)	the	limited	resources	of	executive-level	attention	and	higher-order	thought	(e.g.,	Bo	and	Seidler	(2009);	Ericsson	et	al.	(1980).	As	Beilock	and	colleagues	(2002)	write:		Current	theories	of	skill	acquisition	and	automaticity	suggest…that	well	learned	skill	execution	is	‘automated’—controlled	by	procedural	knowledge	that	requires	little	online	attention	&	control	and	operates	mainly	outside	working	memory	(p.	1211).		Moreover,	because	automatic	motor	routines	can	be	executed	without	(or	with	relatively	little)	conscious	effort	or	deliberate	attention,	the	effort	and	attention	that	would	be	necessary	for	performing	those	actions	can	be	dedicated	to	other	aspects	or	features	of	a	skill,	performance,	or	situation.		For	example,	compare	the	effort	required	when	learning	how	to	use	chopsticks	to	the	experience	of	eating	confidently	with	them.		Very	generally,	once	a	skill	becomes	automatic,	one	can	focus	one’s	energy	on	higher-order	aspects	of	a	performance,	such	as	strategy,	aesthetic	qualities,	or	the	dinner	conversation.	Additionally,	because	the	cognitive	load	of	acting	non-automatically	has	been	reduced,	automatic	actions	can	be	executed	in	parallel	with	other	tasks.	Think	of	driving	a	car	and	flipping	through	radio	stations	at	the	same	time	or	walking	and	texting.	In	fact,	a	resistance	to	dual-task	interference	is	one	of	the	hallmarks	of	automaticity.9		Accordingly,	as	skills	become	automatic,	they	can	also	become	more	complex.		 	 The	fact	that	skilled	actions	are	in	many	respects	automatic	has	led	many	philosophers	of	different	stripes	and	with	varying	and	often	conflicting	accounts	to	conclude,	incorrectly,	as	I’ll	argue	below,	that	skills	are	mindless	or	bodily.		That	is,	falling	into	the	trap	of	dichotomous	thinking,	philosophers	often	equate	being	automatic	with	being	unintelligent.10		As	I’ve	argued	elsewhere:			
It is not rare in philosophy and psychology to see theorists fall into dichotomous 
thinking about mental phenomena. On one side of the dichotomy there are 
processes that I will label “unintelligent.” These processes are thought to be unconscious, 
implicit, automatic, unintentional, involuntary, procedural, and non-cognitive. 
On the other side, there are “intelligent” processes that are conscious, explicit, controlled, 
intentional, voluntary, declarative, and cognitive. Often, if a process or behavior 
is characterized by one of the features from either of the above lists, the process or 
behavior is classified as falling under the category to which the feature belongs. For 
example, if a process is implicit this is usually considered sufficient for classifying 
it as “unintelligent” and for assuming that the remaining features that fall under the 
“unintelligent” grouping will apply to it as well. Accordingly, if a process or behavior 
  is automatic, philosophers often consider it to be unintelligent (Fridland, forthcoming). 
 	 	 In	fact,	many	philosophers	have	explicitly	stated	that	skilled	actions	are	controlled	by	the	body	and	not	by	the	mind.		So,	for	instance,	even	though	Fred	Dretske’s	(1998)	view	is	much	more	subtle	than	the	following	quote	suggests,	he	can	still	be	found	saying	things	like:		“[I]n	the	case	of	all	skilled	actions,	whether	it	be	tying	your	shoelaces,	playing	a	musical	instrument,	or	dribbling	a	basketball	–	the																																																									9	See,	for	instance:	Logan,	1979;	Posner	and	Snyder,	1975a/1975b.		10	I	don’t	mean	to	suggest	that	all	philosophers	fall	into	this	trap.	There	are	notable	exceptions,	especially	by	those	who	work	on	embodied	cognition.	But,	still,	the	tendency	is	real.”	
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mind	goes	elsewhere	while	the	body	performs.”		And	John	Searle	asserts	that	“[R]epeated	practice	enables	the	body	to	take	over”	(1983,	p.150).	Further,	in	explicating	a	very	different	kind	of	view,	Sutton	and	colleagues,	critiquing	Dreyfus’s	account	of	skill,	writes:	“Only	when	one	is	involved,	and	gets	a	lot	of	practice,	will	the	body	take	over	and	do	the	rest.		There	is	then	neither	thinking	nor	awareness,	neither	attention	nor	choice:	at	this	level	of	fluid	performance,	“an	expert’s	skill	has	become	so	much	a	part	of	him	that	he	need	be	no	more	aware	of	it	than	he	is	of	his	own	body”	(2011,	p.	89).		 All	of	this	is	meant	to	indicate	(not	prove)	that	there	seems	to	be	some	tendency	among	philosophers	to	think	of	automatic	behaviors	as	mindless	or	mechanical,	bodily	phenomena.11	As	such,	skills,	even	very	impressive	skills,	because	they	run	automatically,	are	not	considered	to	be	properly	classified	as	cognitive	or	intelligent	events.	The	idea	is	that	even	though	during	practice,	skills	are	the	objects	of	cognitive	control,	once	a	skill	is	acquired	and	becomes	automatic,	it	no	longer	remains	cognitive	or	intelligent.	So,	whereas	during	practice,	that	is,	when	an	agent	was	a	novice,	her	actions	were	minded,	once	she	becomes	skilled,	they	become	mindless.	 	 	 In	the	following	section,	I	will	argue	that	the	conceptual	move	from	automatic	to	unintelligent	is	mistaken.		I	will	do	this	by	appealing	to	empirical	evidence,	which	indicates	that	automatic	motor	routines	are	fundamentally	minded,	cognitive,	and	intelligent	in	both	their	nature	and	structure.			 	 Before	moving	on,	however,	I’d	like	to	direct	the	reader’s	attention	to	some	bizarre	implications	of	the	kind	of	view	that	most	philosophers	hold.		First	off,	on	the	face	of	it,	it	should	strike	as	backwards	to	think	that	the	actions	of	an	unskilled	novice	are	more	intelligent	than	the	actions	of	an	expert.	After	all,	doesn’t	just	the	opposite	seem	to	be	true?	Surely,	at	the	very	least,	a	theory	of	skill	should	be	committed	to	the	fact	that	the	more	skilled	an	agent,	the	more	controlled,	appropriate,	flexible,	and	manipulable	her	actions	are.12		That	is,	skills	are	qualified	by	features	that	seem	to	be	fundamental	to	intelligence,	generally,	despite	the	fact	that	they	are	automatic.13,	14	In	line	with	this	understanding	of	skill,	does	it	not	also	seem	that	predicates	such	as	“clever”	or	“brilliant”	have	more	business	being	ascribed	to	experts	than	to	the	novices?	15	And	if	this	is	so,	shouldn’t	we	take	this	to	at	least	potentially	tell	us	something	about	the	cognitive	or	intelligent	nature	of	skill?			 	 Finally,	even	if	one	is	unmoved	by	these	general	considerations,	I	expect	that	the	empirical	evidence	concerning	motor	chunking	that	I	will	present	below	will	
																																																								11	See	Fridland	(forthcoming)	for	several	examples	of	philosophers	equating	being	automatic	with	being	unintelligent.	12	See	Logan	(1985)	for	more	on	skill,	control	and	automaticity.	13	See	Fridland	(2015)	for	more	on	the	relationship	between	intelligence	and	learning,	and	more	specifically,	on	the	relationship	between	intelligence	and	flexibility,	transferability,	manipulability	and	appropriateness.	14	See	also	Levy	(2015)	and	Mandelbaum	(2015)	for	more	on	the	connection	between	flexibility	and	intelligence.	15	See	Fridland	(2012)	for	an	explicit	argument	for	this	view.		
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illustrate	how	automatic	motor	routines	are	importantly	cognitive	in	both	their	nature	and	structure.			III.	Motor	Chunking	and	the	Intelligence	of	Automatic	Motor	Routines		 In	the	previous	section,	I	claimed	that	because	skilled	behaviors	are	automatic,	many	philosophers	have	characterized	them	as	mindless.	In	this	section,	by	focusing	on	empirical	research	elucidating	the	underlying	processes	of	automaticity,	I’m	going	to	make	clear	why	the	standard	way	of	thinking	about	the	automatic	motor	routines	constitutive	of	skilled	action	is	largely	wrong.		Specifically,	by	considering	the	nature	of	motor	chunking,	a	process	that	is	widely	believed	to	underlie	the	automation	of	motor	routines,	I	will	highlight	how	a	central	part	of	being	automatic	remains	very	much	cognitive,	controlled,	and	intelligent.	I	will	close	by	providing	some	theoretical	reasons	for	why	this	is	very	much	as	it	should	be.	That	is,	I	will	claim	that	the	automatic	processes	involved	in	skill	exhibit	a	flexibility,	manipulability,	and	responsiveness	to	our	goals	and	reasons,	which	requires	that	they	remain	cognitive	and	controlled.	Moreover,	I’ll	claim	that	this	kind	of	flexibility	and	control	cannot	be	achieved	if	automatic	processes	become	large,	fused,	mindless	motor	programs.			 To	begin,	motor	chunking	is	the	(unfortunately	named)	“process	that	facilitates	movement	production	by	combining	motor	elements	into	integrated	units	of	behavior”	(Wymbs	et	al.	2012,	p.	936).	These	units	or	chunks	are	then	stored	and	executed	as	unified	wholes	(Bo	and	Seidler,	2009;	Kennerley	et	al.,	Sakai	et	al.,	2003,	2004;	Verwey	and	Eikelboom,	2003;	Verwey	et	al.,	2009;	Verwey,	1994).	The	idea	is	that	by	combining	individual	elements	into	a	single	motor	plan,	we	have	the	ability	to	store,	access	and	execute	integrated	units	in	a	way	that	substantially	reduces	our	cognitive	burden	(Bo,	Borza	and	Siedler,	2009;	Ericsson	et	al.,	1980).	More	precisely,	we	don’t	have	to	think	of	and	execute	each	element	in	a	sequence	or	series	individually	but,	rather,	once	a	routine	has	become	automatic,	we	can	store,	access	and	implement	a	cluster	of	elements	together.		So,	for	example,	whereas	we	would	need	to	control	6	individual	elements	in	a	novel	sequence,	when	those	6	elements	are	chunked	into,	e.g.,	2	units	of	3,	we	only	need	to	control,	access,	and	execute	2	elements.	The	same	principle	should	apply	to	tasks	that	have	several	parts	but	not	several	individual	elements,	like	riding	a	bike	or	doing	a	cartwheel.	That	is,	this	principle	should	apply	not	only	to	sequential	learning	but	to	skill	learning	in	general.	Behaviourally,	a	motor	chunk	is	identified	by	the	execution	of	a	quick	succession	of	action	elements	preceded	by	a	longer	pause	(Kennerley	et	al.,	2004;	Verwey	and	Eikelboom,	2003).	So,	using	a	simple	example,	if	one	had	a	series	of	elements	such	as	the	following:	“A	B	C	A	B	C”	a	typical	way	of	chunking	those	elements	would	be	like	this:	[ABC]	[ABC].		The	elements	within	brackets	exhibit	a	strong	connection	to	one	another	as	evidenced	by	their	execution	in	quick	succession	and	the	brackets	and	space	in	between	indicates	a	chunk	or	unit	break	as	evidenced	behaviorally	by	a	pause	before	the	quick	instantiation	of	elements	inside	the	set	or	unit.			 It’s	vital	to	see	that	the	empirical	evidence	concerning	motor	chunking	indicates	this	kind	of	unitization	proceeds	as	a	result	of	two	different,	likely	hierarchical	processes	(Verwey,	2001;	Hikosaka	et	al.	2002,	1999;	Sakai,	2003;	
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Wymbs	et	al.,	2012).	That	is,	motor	representations	are	transformed	in	different	ways	at	different	processing	levels.		And,	for	my	purposes,	it	is	crucial	to	notice	that	the	processes	are	not	only	different	but	likely	opposing.	As	Wymbs	et	al.	(2012)	describes	these	processes	they	are:		a.	Concatenation:	the	formation	of	motor-motor	associations	between	elements	or	sets	of	elements.	b.	Segmentation:	parsing	of	multiple	contiguous	elements	into	shorter	action	sets.		As	I	discuss	each	process	and	its	function	in	facilitating	motor	chunking,	it	will	become	clear	why	getting	clear	on	the	details	of	chunking	challenges	our	notion	of	automatic	motor	routines	as	mindless	or	bodily.		3a.	Concatenation:	The	first	kind	of	process	responsible	for	motor	chunking	is	what	I’ll	call,	following	Wymbs	et	al.	(2012),	concatenation.	This	is	the	process	that	I	think	naturally	comes	to	mind	when	we	think	about	automaticity.	Concatenation	is	best	thought	of	as	an	associative	learning	process	where	individual	action	elements	are	combined	into	wholes	(Verwey,	2001).	So,	individual		elements	of	an	action	sequence	or	task	are	fused	or	bound	together	into	larger	combined	units.		In	brief,	individual	elements	in	a	series	develop	stronger	connections	to	the	other	elements	in	the	sequence	through	the	process	of	concatenation.	Concatenation	can	be	observed	behaviorally	in	the	faster	execution	of	a	sequence	or	series	after	practice.		 In	order	to	elucidate	the	nature	of	concatenation,	I’ll	appeal	to	two	distinct	kinds	of	evidence:	the	first	is	direct	fMRI	evidence	found	during	motor	sequence	learning	and	the	second	is	evidence	from	individuals	with	motor	learning	disorders.	Wymbs	et	al.	(2012),	using	a	cued	sequence	production	task	analyzed	sequence	learning	using	fMRI.	What	they	found	was	that	during	the	concatenation	of	motor	elements,	the	occurrence	of	which	was	assessed	behaviorally,	there	was	increased	activation	in	the	basal	ganglia.		This	result	should	be	unsurprising	since	the	basal	ganglia	has	long	been	implicated	in	motor	learning,	especially	in	procedural	learning	and	in	the	production	of	implicit,	automatic,	and	habitual	behaviors	(Albin	et	al.,	1989).				 This	is	why	it	is	thought	that	individuals	with	Parkinson’s	Disease	(PD),	a	disease	which	involves	deficits	of	dopamine	uptake	by	the	basal	ganglia,	have	difficulty	executing	implicit,	automatic	actions	(Trembley	et	al.,	2010).	And	this	is	also	why	it	is	thought	that	individuals	with	basal	ganglia	damage,	such	as	that	caused	by	basal	ganglia	stroke,	experience	motor	sequence	learning	deficits	(Boyd	et	al.,	2009).	Both	groups	fail	to	automatize	sequences	of	motor	elements	in	the	same	way	as	healthy	controls.	Specifically,	for	this	group	of	individuals,	the	normal	strengthening	of	connections	between	action	elements	that	develops	during	practice	in	healthy	controls	does	not	seem	to	take	hold	and,	thus,	prevents	normal	motor	chunking.	As	such,	PD	patients	and	those	who	have	experienced	basal	ganglia	stroke	experience	difficulties	acquiring	learning	new	automatic	routines	and,	at	times,	in	executing	old	ones.		
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	 Importantly,	for	my	purposes,	neither	patients	with	PD	nor	those	with	basal	ganglia	stroke	seem	to	have	any	deficits	when	it	comes	to	explicit	knowledge	of	motor	sequences	(Boyd	et	al.,	2009).	That	is,	these	patients	have	no	more	trouble	recognizing	or	reporting	the	repeated	patterns	or	sequences	involved	in	a	motor	task	than	healthy	individuals.	As	such,	we	can	be	fairly	certain	that	the	motor	learning	deficits	of	PD	and	basal	ganglia	stroke	patients	are	not	the	result	of	a	personal-level	or	executive-level,	cognitive	failures	to	learn	or	recognize	the	relevant	sequence	elements	or	their	pattern	of	connection.						 I	think	that	concatenation	is	the	kind	of	process	that	most	philosophers	and	sports	psychologists	have	in	mind	when	they	think	of	the	automatization	or	chunking	that	occurs	when	individuals	practice	motor	skills.		And	since	it	is	this	process	that	they	is	central	to	their	thinking,	it	is	unsurprising	that	they	go	on	to	characterize	automatic	motor	routines	as	bodily	or	non-cognitive.		 However,	if	concatenation	was	the	only	process	involved	in	the	automatization	of	motor	routines	then	we’d	expect	to	see	the	connection	between	all	elements	in	a	sequence	increase	to	form	a	large	single	unit	or	motor	plan.	That	is,	if	only	concatenation	were	involved	in	the	unitization	of	automatic	motor	routines	then	we	should	see	an	undifferentiated	associative	increase	in	the	connection	between	all	the	motor	elements	in	a	motor	sequence,	at	least	until	the	relevant	limit	on	working	memory	had	been	reached.16	So,	for	example,	if	concatenation	was	alone	responsible	for	motor	learning,	what	we’d	see	if	we	started	with	a	sequence	like	“A	B	C	A	B	C”	is	a	stronger	connection	between	all	the	elements	in	the	series,	such	that	the	entire	succession	of	elements	could	be	executed	faster.	We	could	represent	such	an	increase	in	associative	strength	as	follows:	[ABCABC].	However,	as	I	indicated	above,	in	healthy	individuals,	motor	chunking	actually	looks	more	like	this:	[ABC]	[ABC].		 As	such,	we	can	see	that	it	is	not	the	case	that	in	healthy	individuals,	motor	chunking	is	simply	the	result	of	a	concatenation	process.	That	is,	it	is	not	the	case	that	motor	chunking	just	manifests	in	a	stronger,	undifferentiated	connection	between	all	action	elements	equally.	Rather,	motor	chunking	manifests	in	a	strong	connection	between	a	set	of	elements	in	an	action	sequence,	and	that	set	is	separated	from	other	sets	of	very	well-integrated	elements	in	a	larger	series.		Importantly,	the	way	that	motor	elements	are	arranged	into	groups	often	follows	a	logical	pattern,	when	such	a	logical	pattern	exists	in	the	sequence	and	can	be	gleaned	by	the	learner.	For	example,	repeating	elements	are	grouped	together	and	there	is	a	break	after	the	completion	of	the	last	element	in	a	pattern	that	is	repeated.	This	grouping,	as	I’ll	discuss	below,	is	not	simply	the	result	of	the	limitations	of	working	memory	but,	rather,	an	efficient	strategy	for	structuring	the	sequence.		 All	of	this	to	say	that	concatenation	is	only	one	part	of	the	chunking	process,	which	underlies	the	automatization	of	motor	routines.	Concatenation	is	an	associative	process	where	(1)	the	basal	ganglia	is	critically	involved	as	indicated	by																																																									16	There	is	some	controversy	over	how	many	elements	can	be	stored	in	working	memory.	Almost	everyone	agrees	that	at	least	3-5	elements	can	be	stored	in	working	memory	(e.g.,	Bo	&	Siedler,	2009;	Pammi	et	al.,	2011)	but	recent	studies	suggest	that	working	memory	can	store	as	many	as	7	-10	(Kennerley	et	al.,	2004;	Sakai,	2003)	elements	and	maybe	more	(Ericsson	et	al.,	1980).	
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direct	fMRI	evidence	and	(2)	the	basal	ganglia	is	an	important	site	of	implicit,	procedural	learning,	which	has	little	to	do	with	personal-level	executive	function,	as	we	know	based	on	evidence	of	motor	learning	disorders	such	as	those	exhibited	in	PD	and	after	basal	ganglia	stroke.		3b.	Parsing:	The	second	process	underlying	motor	chunking	is	a	process	that	I’ll	call,	also	following	Wymbs	et	al.	(2012),	parsing.	This	process	is	responsible	for	cutting	action	sequences	into	shorter	segments.		That	is,	parsing	or	segmentation	works	by	breaking	down	longer	sequences	into	smaller	sets	or	units.	Importantly,	parsing	appears	to	work	in	the	opposite	direction	of	concatenation,	which	fuses	together	individual	elements	into	larger	wholes.		 Crucial	for	the	purposes	of	this	paper,	the	process	of	parsing	seems	not	to	be	an	associative	process	but	an	executive	or	control	one	(Pammi	et	al.,	2012;	Kennerley	et	al.,	2004	Verwey	et	al.,	2011;	Verwey,	2010).		This	characterization	of	parsing	is	supported	by	two	forms	of	empirical	evidence:	direct	fMRI	evidence	observed	during	motor	chunking	and	considerations	based	on	motor	learning	deficits	that	are	related	to	ageing	and	general	cognitive	decline.			 First	off,	in	an	fMRI	study	of	motor	chunking	during	a	cued	sequence	reaction	task,	Wymbs	et	al.	(2012)	found	increased	activity	in	the	dorso-lateral	prefrontal	cortex	in	sequences	that	were	easier	to	segment.	That	is,	in	sequences	that	had	more	natural,	logical	joints	to	parse	and	thus	were	more	likely	to	be	parsed,	Wymbs	et	al.	observed	that	that	the	prefrontal	cortex	was	more	active.	This	evidence	suggests	that	the	segmentation	of	sequences	or	series	into	units	or	sets	is	the	result	of	cognitive	or	control	processes.		We	can	conclude	this	because	the	prefrontal	cortex	is	the	area	of	the	brain	widely	acknowledged	to	be	related	to	executive	function.	Moreover,	upon	reflection,	this	finding	seems	to	make	sense	since	the	choice	of	how	to	parse	a	sequence	should	involve	considerations	about	which	ways	of	parsing	it	would	be	the	most	effective.	In	particular,	these	choices	should	involve	consideration	of	the	logical	structure	of	the	sequence	or	series	since	this	will	determine	how	one	could	best	group	the	sequence	such	that	it	can	be	recalled	and	executed	most	efficiently.		 Another	reason	to	think	that	parsing	involves	executive	areas	is	because	we	see	deficits	in	motor	chunking	that	arise	in	elderly	populations	(Verwey	et	al.,	2011;	Verwey,	2010).	These	deficits	are	thought	to	be	related	to	overall	cognitive	decline	in	ageing.	Moreover,	these	deficits	are	also	related	to	decreased	explicit	knowledge,	specifically,	a	decrease	in	the	ability	to	recognize	and	report	relevant	patterns	or	elements	in	a	sequence	(Bo,	Borza	and	Seidler,	2009;	Verwey	et	al.,	2011,	Verwey,	2010).	This	is	not	to	say	that	elderly	individuals	are	incapable	of	motor	learning	altogether.	In	fact,	the	massively	redundant	motor	system	makes	it	the	case	that	almost	no	injury	or	decline	results	in	a	complete	inability	to	learn	motorically.	So,	just	as	patients	with	basal	ganglia	stroke	are	able	to	improve	and	learn	motor	sequences	to	some	extent	(Boyd,	2009),	elderly	patients	are	also	capable	of	some	motor	learning	(Verwey,	2010).	But,	upon	examination,	it	seems	that	what	the	elderly	patients	do	is	to	learn	associatively—that	is,	they	concatenate	exclusively.	And	so,	after	practice,	elderly	individuals	show	some	improvement	in	their	ability	to	
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produce	action	sequences	faster.	However,	they	do	not	parse	or	segment	sequences	in	the	way	that	would	produce	characteristic	chunks	like	those	in	healthy	controls.	All	of	this	to	say	that	cognitive	decline	seems	connected	to	a	decrease	in	the	process	of	segmentation,	crucial	for	producing	the	motor	chunks	characteristic	of	automaticity.		 We	can	visualize	parsing	in	the	following	way:	we	have	a	sequence	with,	say	6	elements,	and	that	sequence	is	broken	down	or	segmented	into	two	sets.	So,	if	the	sequence	is	“A	B	C	A	B	C”	parsing	would	be	responsible	for	segmenting	the	sequence	into	[A-B-C]	[A-B-C]	where	the	repeating	pattern	ABC	is	broken	into	two	sets,	each	of	which	repeats	the	three-element	pattern	once.	The	dashes	in	between	the	letters	are	meant	to	indicate	that	parsing	is	not	responsible	for	the	increased	connection	between	elements	within	the	set	or	unit.	Rather,	it	seems	that	concatenation	is	the	process	responsible	for	fusing	those	elements	together.			 Further,	what’s	important	to	see	is	that	parsing	isn’t	just	a	stage	in	concatenation.	That	is,	parsed	segments	aren’t	just	waiting	to	be	combined	into	larger	motor	units	as	practice	continues.	Rather,	these	units	are	robust.	That	is,	even	though	their	joints	become	harder	to	detect	as	a	result	of	practice,	with	the	introduction	of	a	dual	interference	task,	we	see	that	the	segments	persist	even	after	extensive	practice	of	over	1000s	of	practice	rounds	(Verwey	&	Eikelboom,	2003).		As	such,	we	should	conclude	that	motor	routines	retain	their	cognitive	structure	even	after	becoming	automatic.	That	is,	motor	representations17	do	not	simply	become	associative	processes	once	they	are	automated	but,	instead,	continue	to	be	structured	in	a	controlled	way.	All	of	this	to	say	that	it	is	not	only	in	practice	that	a	clear	cognitive	element	is	present	in	skill.		In	the	last	section	of	this	essay,	I	will	discuss	why	this	finding	should	be	unsurprising	and,	in	fact,	it	is	exactly	what	we	should	expect	to	be	the	case	if	we	consider	the	nature	and	requirements	of	skill	carefully.		 What’s	more,	we	know	that	the	parsing	of	motor	chunks	is	not	simply	the	result	of	capacity	or	load	constraints.	That	is,	it’s	not	that	a	motor	sequence	is	parsed	simply	because	working	memory	or	the	motor	buffer	can’t	handle	more	elements	in	the	sequence.	And	we	know	this	because	even	sequences	with	as	few	as	4	elements	tend	to	be	parsed,	in	a	robust	way,	into	two	sets	of	two	elements.	And	it	is	universally	accepted	that	4	elements	do	not	exceed	the	capacity	limits	of	working	memory	(Miller,	1956;	see	Miyake	and	Shah,	1999	for	an	overview).		 All	of	this	to	say	that	parsing	is	an	essential	part	of	motor	chunking.	Parsing	is	a	control	or	cognitive	process	as	we	have	seen	indicated	by	both	fMRI	evidence	and	evidence	from	the	abnormal	motor	learning	of	elderly	patients	due	to	cognitive	decline.	Importantly,	parsing	is	involved	in	structuring	the	automatic	motor	routines	according	to	the	internal	logical	of	the	sequence	and	also	according	to	the	demands	of	the	task.	Further,	parsing	is	not	just	a	stage	in	concatenation.	It	is	fundamental	to	the	process	of	chunking.																																																										17	It	may	be	worth	noting	that	I	take	representations	to	be	informational	states	of	a	system.	Sometimes	representations	are	involved	in	carrying	information	in	subpersonal,	modular	systems	that	are	informationally	encapsulated.	In	this	way,	representations	are	not	necessarily	conceptual	or	propositional	and	they	are	not	necessarily	responsive	to	conceptual,	propositional	content.	
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	 As	such,	we	must	accept	that	the	automatization	of	motor	routines	that	occurs	in	skill	learning	is	at	least	partly	cognitive.	That	is,	both	in	the	learning	stages	of	automatizing	motor	routines	and	the	later	stages	of	executing	and	sustaining	them,	cognitive	control	is	involved.	From	this	we	can	conclude	that	the	nature	and	structure	of	automatic	motor	routines	is	not	simply	associative,	mindless	or	bodily,	but	very	much	cognitive.	This	is	not	to	say	that	these	processes	remain	necessarily	conscious	or	are	accessible	to	introspection,	but	it	is	a	mistake	to	think	that	consciousness	is	required	for	cognition	or	mentality.18	So,	what	we	see	is	that	the	automaticity	of	motor	routines	is	not	simply	a	brute,	bodily	phenomenon	but	importantly	controlled	by	higher-order	cognitive	functions.		3c.	Parsing	and	Concatenation	Together	then,	the	way	that	we	can	visualize	chunking	is	as	follows:	we	begin	with	a	sequence	such	as	“	A	B	C	A	B	C”	and	the	sequence	is	concatenated	such	that	the	connections	between	individual	elements	become	stronger.	We	might	visualize	that	a	series	becomes	strengthened	through	concatenation	such	that	it	looks	like	this:	[ABCABC].	Simultaneously,	the	series	is	parsed	into	smaller	sets.	One	natural	way	of	parsing	this	series	would	be:	[ABC]	[ABC].		The	elements	inside	the	sets	benefit	from	being	fused	together	by	the	concatenation	process	and	this	explains	why	the	chunked	elements	inside	the	set	are	executed	in	fast,	quick	succession.		However,	the	sets	retain	robust	joints,	which	explains	the	pauses	before	the	quick	execution	of	the	elements	in	the	set.	It	is	likely	the	case	that	at	a	higher	processing	level	the	sets,	treated	as	individual	units,	are	also	concatenated	such	that	the	pauses	in	between	them	become	smaller	and	smaller	(Sakai	et	al.,	2003;	Verwey,	1996)—but,	importantly,	the	joints	still	remain	structurally	robust,	as	we	can	see	through	the	addition	of	a	dual-interference	task.	In	the	following	section,	I’ll	claim	that	if	we	reflect	on	the	nature	of	skill,	it	should	become	clear	that	the	reason	that	sets	retain	robust	joints	is	so	that	they	can	be	controlled,	intervened	upon	and	manipulated	as	is	necessary	for	skilled	action.			 So,	to	conclude,	we	see	that	automaticity	proceeds	by	two	simultaneous	processes:	on	one	level	we	have	sequences	that	are	broken	down	or	parsed	into	smaller	units	and	on	another	level	those	units	are	combined	or	concatenated	into	larger	representations.	And,	as	we	saw	above,	the	parsing	likely	involves	executive	or	control	functions	and	the	concatenation	is	likely	a	result	of	lower	level	associative	processes.			4.	Parsing	&	Concatenation:	Theoretical	considerations			In	this	section,	I	want	to	turn	our	attention	to	some	theoretical	considerations	for	why	it	should	be	unsurprising	that	the	automatization	of	motor	routines	through	motor	chunking	involves	both	associative	and	control	processes.			 Let’s	begin	with	a	simple	example	of	skill:	bike	riding.	The	reason	for	concatenation,	I	take	it,	is	easy	to	provide.	It’s	what	everyone	naturally	assumes	about	automaticity.	That	is,	for	reasons	of	efficiency	of	storage																																																									18	See,	for	instance,	Rosenthal	(1986)	and	Chalmers	(1995)	for	more	on	mentality	and	cognitive	function	without	consciousness.	
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and	execution,	it’s	important	for	action	sequences	to	be	combined	into	larger	units	so	that	they	require	fewer	cognitive	resources	to	implement.	Concatenation,	it	seems,	is	likely	responsible	for	our	capacity	to	fluidly,	smoothly,	and	elegantly	combine	several	tasks	together.		Concatenation	allows	us	to	move	from	one	task	to	another	without	having	to	think	explicitly	about	each	consecutive	task	and	its	connection	to	other	tasks.	For	example,	concatenation	would	be	responsible	for	our	ability	to	pedal	our	feet	in	constant	motion	and	lean	into	a	curve	and	shift	gears	smoothly,	and	steer	all	at	once.	And	maybe	even	to	hold	a	conversation	with	a	fellow	rider	or	to	navigate	in	an	unfamiliar	city,	to	boot.		 The	reason	for	parsing,	however,	I	think	is	rather	different.	As	opposed	to	reducing	cognitive	load,	it	seems	to	me	that	the	parsing	or	segmentation	of	a	sequence	is	required	for	the	flexibility,	manipulability,	and	capacity	for	easy	adjustments	and	varied	responses	that	is	at	the	heart	of	skillful	activity.	For	instance,	to	return	to	our	example,	the	parsing	of	action	parts	is	necessary	to	retain	the	ability,	to,	for	example,	slow	down	one’s	pedal	strokes	to	the	appropriate	degree,	let’s	say,	when	one	notices	that	there	is	traffic	on	the	road	ahead	or	to	lean	into	a	curve,	but	maybe	a	little	less	than	usual,	because	of	another	vehicle	in	the	next	lane.	Parsing	may	also	be	responsible	for	one’s	ability	to	slow	down	to	take	a	look	at	a	new	store	front	or	to	focus	on	keeping	one’s	feet	parallel	to	the	ground,	when	trying	to	improve	one’s	cycling	posture.	The	idea	is	that	keeping	action	joints	robust	allows	us	to	make	the	relevant	adjustments	and	interventions	in	a	performance	based	on	our	specific	goals	and	strategies.	That	is,	if	all	action	elements	were	fused	together	into	wholes	without	joints	then	one	would	lose	the	easy	ability	to	intervene	on	the	skill	as	it	is	unfolding	in	the	various	relevant	and	context-sensitive	ways	that	are	characteristic	of	skill.	In	short,	is	the	existence	of	joints	that	I	am	claiming	allows	for	the	flexibility	of	skill.		 We	might	take	these	considerations	about	what	is	required	for	skilled	action	even	further.		Rather	than	starting	with	an	individuated	set	of	distinct	elements,	as	is	almost	always	done	in	the	lab,	we	might	think	that	what	often	happens	with	skill	learning	in	the	wild	is	that	we	start	with	a	more	or	less	undifferentiated	movement—one	that,	through	trial	and	error,	we	have	gotten	to	achieve	task	success	in	some	context	or	other—and	then	we	break	down	that	movement,	that	is,	we	parse	or	segment	that	movement	into	smaller	parts.	Those	parts	then	become	elements	that	we	are	able	to	control,	manipulate,	and	adjust	in	a	more	and	more	flexible	and	controlled	manner.	That	is,	through	practice,	we	insert	joints	into	our	skilled	motor	routines.		 And	it	seems	that	if	we	look	at	skill	acquisition	and	skill	refinement	from	a	developmental	perspective,	this	is	exactly	what	happens.	That	is,	we	just	so	happen	to	stumble	on	a	successful	solution	to	a	problem	and	then,	by	performing	the	action	over	and	over	and	over	again,	we	develop	the	capacity	to	control	the	relevant	temporal	and	spatial	parameters	of	the	action	in	a	more	and	more	fine-grained	way.	This	control	is	necessary	for	successfully	instantiating	the	task	in	multiple	different	but	similar	contexts.				 For	example,	we	can	think	of	something	as	simple	as	learning	to	use	a	fork.	At	first,	we	can	see	children	struggle	to	get	the	fork	to	their	mouths	without	dropping	their	food	along	the	way.	Even	if	the	food	stays	on	the	fork,	they	might	not	be	able	to	
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get	it	directly	into	their	mouths	but	instead	they	bring	the	fork	to	their	chin,	cheek,	or	nose	instead.	But,	as	is	well	known,	with	time	and	practice,	children	turn	into	experts.	They	figure	out	how	to	balance	different	kinds	of	foods	on	their	forks	and	to	smoothly	get	the	food	directly	into	their	mouths	in	ways	that	reflect	a	sensitivity	to	the	different	kinds	of	foods	on	the	fork,	the	different	size	of	bites,	their	different	weights,	etc.	My	suggestion	is	that	we	should	conceptualize	this	process	as	follows:	instead	of	learning	each	part	of	the	fork	to	mouth	task	independently	and	then	combining	individual	elements	together,	children	seem	to	begin	with	one	more	or	less	undifferentiated	movement	and	then	come	to	break	that	large,	clumsy	movement	down	into	a	movement	with	smaller	and	smaller	sections	that	they	can	then	adjust	and	manipulate	flexibly	as	needed.	That	is,	they	develop	control	by	instituting	action	joints	at	the	relevant	points	of	an	action.19			 If	this	is	the	case,	then	our	conception	of	the	chunking	process	would	go	something	like	this:	we	start	with	a	more	or	less	large,	undifferentiated,	and	thus	cumbersome,	clumsy	movement	and	then	we	break	that	movement	into	segments—into	smaller	parts	that	we	can	exert	control	over.		The	process	of	concatenation	would	continue	to	be	required	in	order	to	ensure	that	those	segments	are	connected	in	such	a	way	as	to	retain	the	flow,	fluidity	and	smoothness	that	is	characteristic	of	skilled	action	and,	further,	that	when	particular	manipulation	isn’t	required,	the	action	can	unfold	in	a	straightforward	way	without	intervention	and	without	the	need	for	attention	or	higher-order	thought.		 	What’s	important	for	my	purposes	is	to	see	that	when	we	frame	things	in	this	way,	even	after	acquisition,	automatic	motor	routines	remain	importantly	cognitive.	That	is,	we	see	that	the	cognition	involved	in	skill	is	not	simply	relevant	for	the	acquisition	phase	of	skill,	but	is	retained	in	the	shape	and	structure	of	the	automatic	motor	routines	constitutive	of	skill.	It	stands	to	reason	that	if	one	continues	to	refine	one’s	skills,	that	is,	to	practice	them	with	the	deliberate	aim	of	improving	at	a	task,	then	one	would	anticipate	that	actions	would	continue	to	be	broken	down	into	more	and	more	fine-grained	parts	that	are	themselves	concatenated	but	which	can	be	executed	successfully	in	more	and	more	variable	circumstances.		If	this	were	the	case,	then	we	would	be	able	to	explain	why	continued	practice	yields	continued	and	expanded	control	and	flexibility	and	not	simply	faster	and	more	accurate	but	ultimately	inflexible	movements.			 Further,	this	way	of	framing	things	may	also	give	us	an	explanation	of	why	variability	in	practice	not	only	produces	more	efficient	learning,20	but	why	it	is	that	experts	often	attempt	to	reduce	the	automaticity	of	their	motor	routines.	As	John	Sutton	writes:																																																										19	A	related	question	is	whether	non-human	primates	are	capable	of	and/or	inclined	to	engage	in	this	kind	of	parsing	of	behavioral	repertoires.	Work	by	Byrne	(2003)	suggests	the	non-human	primates	represent	complex	behaviors	as	sequences	or	what	they	call	behavioral	programs	but	it	isn’t	at	this	point	known	if	non-human	primates	ever	take	those	behavioral	elements	as	intentional	objects	to	refine,	improve,	or	recombine,	as	humans	do	in	practice	and	teaching.	That	is,	if	they	function	as	genuine	sequences.	See	Sterelny	(2012)	and	Fridland	(2014)	for	related	considerations.	20	See,	for	instance:	Hall	&	Magill,	1995;	Lee,	Magill,	&	Weeks,	1985;	Moxley,1979;	Schmidt,	1975;	Schmidt	&	Bjork,	1992	for	more	or	the	effects	of	variability	in	practice	on	skill	learning.	
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In	many	distinctive	domains,	elite	practitioners	specifically	resist	the	kind	of	automation	which	Dreyfus	ascribes	to	the	highest	levels	of	expertise,	worrying	that	trusting	the	body	alone	to	take	over	will	lead	to	arrested	development.	Just	as	they	challenge	themselves	constantly	and	deliberately	in	practice,	they	know	that	in	performance	they	will	be	constantly	opened	up	to	new	limits.	As	Rietveld	argues,	“every	situation	contains	perturbing	influences”,	with	new	affective	influences	always	potentially	altering	our	evaluations	of	significance.		So	expert	performers	precisely	“counteract	automaticity”,	because	it	limits	their	ability	to	make	specific	adjustments	on	the	fly	(2011,	p.	95).		 		 This	would	explain	why	practicing	in	a	variety	of	circumstances	and	focusing	on	different	aspects	of	one’s	technique	at	different	times	is	so	important	for	developing	expertise.	That	is,	if	we	think	of	segmentation	as	that	process	by	which	we	achieve	control	over	our	motor	skills—and	we	think	of	variability	as	the	way	in	which	we	promote	parsing	or	segmentation,	or	resist	concatenation—then	we	see	why	variability	is	so	important	for	skill.		One	way	of	putting	this	would	be	as	follows:	variability	in	practice	is	required	to	keep	our	skills	from	becoming	habits.		 Another	relevant	issue	here	connects	parsing	to	teaching	and	demonstration.	As	I’ve	explained,	once	the	elements	of	a	skill	are	parsed	it	becomes	possible	to	treat	them	as	intentional	objects	in	their	own	right,	objects	to	adjust,	control,	and	improve.	But,	importantly,	once	they	become	the	objects	of	thought	they	can	also	become	the	objects	of	transmission.	Put	simply,	once	I	can	think	about	the	technique	I	employ	in	performing	a	skill,	I	can	also	draw	someone	else’s	attention	to	that	technique.	And,	further,	since	I	have	control	over	the	elements	that	compose	the	skill,	I	can	demonstrate	to	someone	else	how	to	perform	it	correctly,	potentially	contrasting	it	in	various	subtle	ways	with	mistakes	or	improper	ways	of	instantiating	the	element	or	technique.	That	is,	once	skills	are	parsed,	what	becomes	available	to	an	agent	is	not	only	the	capacity	to	control	and	improve	them	but	to	transmit	them	as	well.21		 Taken	together,	all	of	this	should	help	us	to	see	that	the	mindless	conception	of	automatic	motor	routines	is	simply	misguided.	Rather,	we	should	hold	that	cognition	is	involved	both	during	the	practice	stage	of	skill	acquisition	and,	also,	guides	the	representation	and	implementation	of	automatic	motor	routines,	after	a	skill	is	acquired.	That	is,	cognitive	control	dictates	the	structure	of	our	motor	representations	and	our	ability	to	manipulate	and	control	those	representations	during	skill	refinement	and	execution.			 So,	it	isn’t	simply	that	when	it	comes	to	skill,	cognitive	control	is	present	at	the	level	of	strategy	or	high	level	planning,	or	at	the	level	of,	say,	aesthetic	expressiveness	or	even	simply	during	the	practice	leading	up	to	skill	acquisition—but	that	intelligence	is	present	in	the	actual	representation	and	execution	of	automatic	motor	routines.	That	is,	cognition	has	to	be	present	in	the	automatic	execution	of	skills	if	we	are	going	to	have	control	that	is	flexible,	manipulable	and	responsive	to	our	goals,	reasons,	and	wills.22																																																									21	For	more	on	the	connection	between	the	technique-centered	orientation,	high-fidelity	transmission	of	skills,	and	teaching,	see	Fridland	(forthcoming	b.).			22	To	put	it	provocatively:	if	we	are	to	have	dispositions	that	are	going	to	track	knowledge,	that	is,	dispositions	that	will	allow	us	to	know	what	to	do,	when	and	where	to	do	it	and	with	how	much,	then	
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	5.	In	defence	of	control	I	have	offered	an	explanation	of	parsing	in	terms	of	the	control	of	skilled	action.		Specifically,	I’ve	suggested	that	skilled	action	instantiations	needs	robust	joints	or	segments	to	remain	flexible	and	manipulable.23	However,	this	story	is	at	odds	with	a	popular,	competing	explanation.		Verwey	(2001),	though	agreeing	that	motor	chunking	occurs	at	two	processing	levels,	interprets	these	two	levels	differently	from	the	way	I	do.	According	to	Verwey	(2001),	“a	motor	processor	rapidly	executes	the	tightly	coupled	elements	within	each	chunk,	and	the	cognitive	processor	prepares	each	chunk	for	the	motor	processor.	In	this	case,	the	pauses	are	due	to	planning	at	a	supraordinate	cognitive	level.”	(Wymbs	et	al.,	p.13).	Specifically,	Verwey	claims	that	in	a	familiar,	overlearned	movement,	“	the	cognitive	processor…selects	a	single	representation	–a	motor	chunk—for	the	entire	sequence	which	is	subsequently	read	and	executed	by	a	dedicated	motor	processor”	(p.71).	As	such,	instead	of	being	involved	in	the	control	and	manipulation	of	the	action,	as	I	have	suggested,	according	to	Verwey,	cognition	is	required	for	planning,	which	is	accomplished	through	the	representation	of	a	familiar	movement	as	a	cluster	or	whole.	However,	the	empirical	evidence	does	not	support	Verwey’s	explanation	for	two	reasons:	First	off,	if	the	cognitive	aspect	of	skill	was	concerned	with	planning	skilled	behaviors	by	producing	higher-order	representations	of	action	sequences	then	we	would	expect	to	see	cognitive	areas	at	work	in	concatenation.	That	is,	if	planning	were	responsible	for	combining	action	segments	together,	as	concatenation	seems	to	do,	and	if	planning	is	a	higher-order	cognitive	process	then	the	fMRI	evidence	should	show	executive	areas	involved	in	concatenation	of	action	elements.	However,	as	I	have	reviewed	above,	this	is	not	what	we	see.	In	fact,	we	see	that	concatenation	seems	largely	to	be	an	associative	process.	As	such,	it	is	unlikely	that	the	cognition	responsible	for	motor	chunking	is	concerned	with	planning	through	the	higher-order	representation	of	actions	sequences	as	wholes.		Moreover,	if	it	were	the	case	that	cognitive	control	was	required	for	planning	or	preparing	the	motor	segments	stored	in	the	motor	processor	then	one	would	expect	pauses	in	between	segments	to	max	out	the	capacity	of	working	memory.	However,	this	also	seems	not	to	be	the	case,	as	we	regularly	see	chunks	with	as	few	as	2	elements	(Verwey,	1996;	Sakai,	2003;	Pammi	et	al.	2012).	Since	the	higher-order	representation	of	action	elements	could	easily	represent	more	than	2	elements	at	a	time,	it	remains	plausible	that	the	pauses	in	between	chunks	are	not	primarily	due	to	planning	or	preparation.	I	have	suggested	above	that	the	breaks	in	between	motor	chunks	are	best	explained	in	terms	of	control,	flexibility,	manipulability	and	the	easy	adjustment	of	skills	in	light	of	changing	goals	and	reasons.	I	maintain	that	such	an	explanation	is	able	to	do	justice	to	the	empirical	evidence	regarding	motor	chunking.																																																																																																																																																																						those	dispositions	themselves	must	be	structured	in	an	intelligent	fashion.	This	is	provocative	relative	to	Stanley	and	Williamson’s	(2015)	view	of	skill.	23	See	Shepherd	(2014)	for	a	similar	way	of	conceptualising	control	as	connected	to	flexible	execution.		
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	6.	Conclusion:	To	review,	in	the	previous	sections,	I	have	argued	that	practice	and	skill	are	intimately	related	such	that	practice	is	responsible	for	automatizing	our	skilled	actions.	I	have	also	argued	that	the	fact	that	skilled	actions	are	automatic	has	led	some	philosophers	to	misconstrue	skill	as	mindless	or	bodily.	In	order	to	remedy	this	misconception,	I	have	appealed	to	empirical	evidence	of	motor	chunking.	Importantly,	this	evidence	reveals	that	there	are	two	opposing	processes	involved	in	the	automaticity	of	skilled	action:	one	process	that	is	largely	associative	and	another	that	is	cognitive	and	controlled.	This	evidence	demonstrates	that	skills	are	minded	and	intelligent	in	both	their	nature	and	structure.		I	have	ended	by	presenting	some	theoretical	reasons	for	why	these	findings	are	exactly	what	we	should	expect,	if	we	reflect	seriously	on	the	character	of	skilled	actions.		 Before	closing,	I’d	like	to	note	that	though	my	considerations	here	have	been	largely	limited	to	issues	regarding	the	nature	of	skill	it	should	be	clear	that	understanding	the	intelligence	of	motor	skill	has	some	relevant	implications	for	neighboring	fields.	For	instance,	I’ve	argued	that	automaticity	is	not	mindless	and	I	have	pointed	specifically	to	ways	in	which	automatic	motor	routines	retain	their	cognitive	and	controlled	character	after	automation.		If	this	way	of	thinking	about	motor	chunking	is	correct	then	it	seems	that	advocates	of	embodied	cognition	have	additional	resources	for	conceiving	of	the	body	as	intelligent.	That	is,	as	opposed	to	thinking	of	the	body	or	bodily	action	as	uniformly	intelligent	or	cognitive,	the	considerations	I’ve	provided	in	this	paper	can	help	to	differentiate	the	intelligence	of	different	bodily	phenomena	and	specify	both	where	those	phenomena	are	intelligent	and	why	we	should	think	of	them	as	such.		 Finally,	I’ve	argued	that	automatic	processes	may	retain	their	cognitive	character	even	after	becoming	fast	and	fluid.	This	way	of	understanding	automaticity	has	implications	not	only	for	a	theory	of	skill	but,	more	generally,	for	a	theory	of	the	mind.		This	is	especially	clear	if	we	consider	the	dual-systems	theory	of	cognitive	processing.	According	to	the	dual	systems	theory,	our	mind	is	composed	of	two	largely	independent	processing	streams.	System	one	is	an	ancient,	automatic,	fast,	point-and-shoot	system	that	implements	fixed,	inflexible	heuristic	rules	or	programs	and	system	two,	in	contrast,	which	is	evolutionarily	recent,	slow,	deliberate	and	flexible	(Gigerenzer,	et	al.	(1999),	Haidt	(2001),	Kahneman	(2011),	Greene	(2014).		If	what	I’ve	said	about	skill	is	correct,	and	automatic	processes	can	be	both	cognitive	in	nature	and	structure	then	there	may	be	a	way	to	reformulate	our	conception	of	the	ancient,	fast,	system	from	one	that	is	fixed	to	one	that	adjusts	in	a	flexible	yet	constrained	manner.	That	is,	if	automatic	processes	can	be	honed	and	refined	through	practice	and	training	then	it	is	at	least	possible	that	the	automatic,	fast,	and	fluid	processing	of	system	one	is	also	responsive	to	training	and	practice	such	that	it	adjusts	in	various	appropriate	ways	to	the	goals,	intentions,	and	actions	of	agents.	In	this	way,	understanding	the	nature	of	skill	and	skill	learning	has	broad	implications	for	our	understanding	of	cognition	and	cognitive	processing	at	large.	I	hope	this	paper	has	shown	why	that	is.			
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